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Abstract
We demonstrate that stock price momentum and earnings momentum can result from
uncertainty surrounding the accuracy of cashflow forecasts. Our model has multiple in-
formation sources issuing cashflow forecasts for a stock. The investor combines these
forecasts into an aggregate cashflow estimate that has minimal mean-squared forecast
error. This aggregate estimate weights each cashflow forecast by the estimated accuracy
of its issuer, which is obtained from their past forecast errors. Momentum arises from
the investor gradually learning about the relative accuracy of the information sources
and updating their weights. Empirical tests validate the model’s prediction of stronger
momentum in stocks with large information weight fluctuations and high forecast dis-
persion. We also identify return predictability attributable to changes in the information
weights.
JEL Classification: G12, G14
I Introduction
This paper studies the theoretical and empirical implications of forecast accuracy uncertainty
on stock returns. Our representative investor receives a disperse range of forecasts regard-
ing a firm’s future cashflow growth but is uncertain about the accuracy of the information
sources issuing these forecasts. The investor optimally combines the forecasts into an ag-
gregate cashflow estimate. To minimize the mean-squared forecast error of this aggregate
estimate, the investor assigns more weight to forecasts issued by more accurate information
sources. The corresponding aggregate cashflow estimate represents the investor’s expectation
of future cashflow growth and determines the firm’s stock price.
The investor estimates the accuracy of each information source from their past forecast
errors.1 As additional cashflow realizations and forecast errors become available, the investor
learns about their respective accuracy. Intuitively, an information source’s true accuracy
represents its unobservable “skill” at forecasting a firm’s cashflow. Investors understand the
uncertainty inherent in measuring this skill and gradually update their assessment of each
information source’s accuracy.2
Our model features a risk-neutral representative investor, constant fundamental risk, and
a constant discount rate. Expected stock returns are driven entirely by innovations in the
investor’s aggregate cashflow estimate. These innovations are determined by changes in the
information weights and the dynamics of individual forecasts. We focus on the role of time-
varying information weights, which has not been previously studied, by assuming that the
individual cashflow growth forecasts are, on average, constant over short horizons.
Although our investor immediately incorporates newly issued or revised forecasts into
their conditional cashflow expectation, the weights assigned to these forecasts are gradually
updated.3 The gradual updating of the information weights generates return predictability.
In particular, earnings momentum and price momentum arise from learning about the relative
1Sinha, Brown, and Das (1997), Brown (2001), and Clement and Tse (2003) find that prior forecast errors
predict the future forecast accuracy of analysts.
2Section A. contains additional justification for the gradual updating of the forecast accuracy estimates.
3This gradual updating is distinct from the slow diffusion of information in Hong and Stein (1999) and
Hong, Torous, and Valkanov (2007).
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forecast accuracy of the information sources. For example, after a series of positive cashflow
innovations, hence price increases, the estimated accuracy of relatively optimistic information
sources tends to improve. Thus, their information weights increase at the expense of pes-
simistic information sources. As a consequence, the optimistic information sources exert a
greater influence on the aggregate cashflow estimate. This shift in the information weights
leads to higher expected cashflow growth and a higher stock price, although the individual
forecasts remain unchanged (on average).
Momentum in our framework does not originate from a time-varying risk premium or from
the behavioral biases assumed in Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) and Daniel, Hirshleifer,
and Subrahmanyam (1998). Interestingly, certain characteristics of the information weights
mimic these biases, although our investor is not assumed to be influenced by behavioral bi-
ases. Furthermore, unlike agents in rational expectation models, our investor is not concerned
with the impact of their learning on prices. Therefore, the statistical optimization underly-
ing our aggregate cashflow estimate offers a middle ground between behavioral and rational
perspectives on momentum.4
Our framework offers several empirical predictions. Momentum is expected to be stronger
for stocks with greater fluctuations in their information weights. This unique prediction is
verified using analyst forecasts. In addition, we confirm our framework’s prediction that
momentum is stronger for stocks with greater cashflow uncertainty using analyst forecast
dispersion as a proxy. A simulation study also verifies that under reasonable parameters,
forecast accuracy uncertainty produces momentum profits whose magnitude is comparable to
existing empirical studies.
Several other predictions from our model are consistent with the empirical evidence in
Jiang, Lee, and Zhang (2005), Daniel and Titman (2006), Jackson and Johnson (2006), and
Zhang (2006), although we provide a new interpretation of their findings. For example, we
predict stronger momentum in stocks with fewer available forecast errors; including small
4Our representative investor holds the risky asset at every point in time and cannot profit from momentum.
Limits to arbitrage and market frictions can prevent arbitrageurs from eliminating the momentum induced by
their learning. Indeed, cashflow uncertainty may limit the willingness of arbitrageurs to implement momentum
strategies.
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firms, young firms, and those undergoing significant changes in their cashflow growth. Stronger
momentum for stocks with higher return volatility and higher cashflow volatility are also
predicted.
Timmermann (1993) and Lewellen and Shanken (2002) examine the ability of parameter
uncertainty to generate return predictability. In contrast, our investor does not model time-
varying cashflow dynamics and does not learn about a firm’s cashflow growth parameters
from realized cashflows. Moreover, cashflow growth uncertainty alone cannot generate return
predictability. Instead, our investor’s reliance on multiple cashflow forecasts with time-varying
weights is crucial.
Our framework also differs from Hong, Stein, and Yu (2007)’s model that has a repre-
sentative investor using simple univariate models to forecast cashflow when the true cashflow
generating process is multivariate. The investor in Hong, Stein, and Yu (2007) is limited to
a subset of available information and permanently alternates between two incorrect forecast
procedures. In contrast, our investor conditions on all available forecasts when forming their
cashflow expectation. Overall, the uncertainty that surrounds the relative accuracy of different
cashflow forecasts has not appeared in the existing literature.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the optimal
information weights, the learning mechanism regarding forecast accuracy, and the pricing im-
plications of forecast accuracy uncertainty. Section III evaluates the implications of changes
in the information weights on stock returns, earnings momentum, and price momentum. Sec-
tion IV summarizes and concludes the paper.
II The Model
Following Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), our economy consists of a single risky security
(stock) and a risk-neutral representative investor with an exogenous constant discount rate δ.
All cashflows Nt are paid out as dividends. Under the objective probability, cashflow growth
yt+1 ≡ Nt+1−Nt is assumed to be independent over time, with an unknown and time-varying
3
mean θt+1:
yt+1 = θt+1 + εt+1, (1)
θt+1 ∼ N (θ̄, σ2θ), (2)
εt+1 ∼ N (0, σ2y). (3)
The parameter θ̄ represents the unconditional average cashflow growth rate, and is set to
zero without loss of generality. A nonzero unconditional mean cashflow growth rate adds a
constant term to the average stock return but does not affect our conclusions regarding return
predictability.5 The parameter σθ captures the uncertainty surrounding expected cashflow
growth, while σy measures the stock’s fundamental risk. With risk-neutrality, fundamental
risk does not influence stock prices.
The critical component of price formation is the investor’s conditional expectation of future
cashflow growth. In our model, realized cashflow growth is uninformative regarding future
cashflow growth.6 Instead, our investor receives multiple forecasts of future cashflow growth,
with each forecast issued by a different information source (such as a sell-side analyst). In-
formation sources issue cashflow growth forecasts for the next period.7 Specifically, on date
t, the investor observes the forecast µjt for yt+1 issued by the j
th information source where
j = 1, . . . , J .
The investor forms their conditional expectation of future cashflow growth by optimally
combining the available forecasts into a single aggregate estimate that has the lowest mean-
squared forecast error. Intuitively, the investor assigns more weight to forecasts issued by more
accurate information sources. The crucial assumption is that the investor does not know the
true forecast accuracy of the information sources but learns about their accuracy.
Although the investor uses the cashflow growth forecasts to form their conditional ex-
5The unconditional mean of cashflow growth θ̄ may also be uncertain. In this generalization, the investor
learns about this unconditional mean and treats their expectation regarding its value as an additional forecast.
We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this generalization.
6This property is consistent with Chan, Karceski, and Lakonishok (2003)’s finding that realized cashflows
are poor predictors of future cashflows. Our investor does not learn about the parameters underlying cashflow
growth from realized cashflows, as in Lewellen and Shanken (2002).
7Information sources can issue forecasts for a sequence of future cashflows without altering our predictions.
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pectation of cashflow growth, they cannot directly evaluate the usefulness of these forecasts
because the conditional mean of cashflow growth is unobservable and time-varying. We as-
sume that their conditional expectation Et[yt+1|µjt ] under the objective probability coincides
with the unconditional mean of cashflow growth, which is zero. This ensures that stock return
predictability does not arise because observable state variables can predict cashflow growth.
A. Optimal Weights and Forecast Accuracy Uncertainty
The investor combines the J cashflow forecasts available at time t into a single aggregate









ωjt = 1 . (4)
The ωjt weights are chosen to minimize the mean-squared forecast error of the aggregate
cashflow growth estimate, Et[(yt+1 − µ̂t)2].
Let Wt denote a column vector of weights ω
j
t , and εt+1 a column vector of the forecast
errors, with jth component εj,t+1 ≡ yt − µjt−1. Because yt+1 − µ̂t = W Tt εt+1 (superscript T
denotes matrix transpose), the minimization of Et[(yt+1 − µ̂t)2] is equivalent to the following
min
Wt
W Tt ΘtWt (5)
subject to: 1T Wt = 1 ,
where 1 denotes a J-dimensional vector of ones, and Θt = Et[εt+1ε
T
t+1] is a J by J matrix. Wt
summarizes the optimal weights assigned to each information source’s cashflow growth forecast
at time t. The aggregate cashflow estimate µ̂t, which combines all available forecasts using
their optimal weights, serves as the investor’s conditional expectation of cashflow growth. By
definition, this aggregate cashflow estimate has the lowest mean-squared forecast error among
all other possible estimates.
The information sources are not assumed to issue unbiased forecasts. Thus, the conditional




= Vart [εt+1] + (Et [εt+1])
2, the investor
accounts for potential forecast biases when minimizing the mean-squared forecast error. Lim
(2001) argues that mean-squared forecast error is the appropriate metric for measuring analyst
accuracy.
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The minimization in (5) is reminiscent of the Markowitz (1952) minimum variance port-
folio. However, our investor optimally combines multiple cashflow forecasts for a single stock
into an aggregate cashflow estimate, rather than combining multiple stocks into a portfolio.





The corresponding aggregate cashflow growth estimate equals




where µt = (µ
1
t , . . . , µ
j
t , . . . , µ
J
t )
T is the vector of cashflow growth forecasts.
The optimal weights in (6) are determined by the matrix Θt = Et[εt+1ε
T
t+1], whose elements












εj,t−i εk,t−i . (8)
Statistically, (7) equals the mean-squared forecast error of an information source. Intuitively,
(7) represents the credibility of the jth forecast, with larger forecast errors reducing an infor-
mation source’s credibility.
The estimation of Θt utilizes past forecast errors but not the contemporaneous forecast
error εt. This feature captures a gradual updating of an information source’s estimated accu-
racy, and stems from the uncertainty associated with measuring their skill at forecasting future
cashflows.8 Although the investor immediately incorporates newly released or revised forecasts
into their aggregate cashflow estimate, they revise the estimated accuracy of the information
sources less frequently. Information processing costs would also slow the updating of the es-
timated forecast accuracies. Finally, forecast revisions between non-earnings-announcement
dates are not accompanied by additional cashflow realizations. Hence, contemporaneous fore-
cast errors are unavailable, and the investor has to rely on past forecast errors in these in-
stances.
8This parallels the uncertainty surrounding a fund manager’s skill. Although fund returns are available
daily, the assessment of manager skill is conducted less frequently.
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Appendix A shows that the optimal weights in (6), when Θt are estimated as in (7) and
(8), coincide with the slope coefficients of the following regression
Y = UW + ε,
where Y is the vector of past realized cashflow innovations {yt−1, . . . , yt−n}, and U is a n by
J matrix whose jth column is the vector of past forecasts from the jth information source.
Observe that the above regression does not have an intercept and the slope coefficients are
required to sum to one.
Our aggregate cashflow estimate can be understood in a Bayesian context. For simplicity,
assume the forecasts µjt represent uncorrelated signals regarding θt+1:
µjt = θt+1 + η
j
t+1 , (9)
where ηjt+1 is a mean zero error term. When the investor has a diffuse prior with mean zero
for θt+1, the Bayesian posterior mean is a weighted average of the µ
j
t forecasts whose weights
are proportional to each forecast’s precision (inverse of their variance). This feature is also
apparent in the optimal weights defined by (6).
The regression interpretation of the information weights and the Bayesian interpretation of
the aggregate cashflow growth estimate both depend on the normality assumption underlying
(2) and (3). However, the minimization of mean-squared forecast error does not require
any distributional assumptions. Thus, the weights in (6) are optimal without the normality
assumption.
B. Return Implications of Weight Updating
We now examine the asset pricing implications of our aggregate cashflow estimate. The risk-
neutrality of the representative investor and a discount rate equal to δ imply the (ex-dividend)







+ · · · , (10)
where EIt [−] denotes the investor’s date t expectation conditional on the J cashflow growth
forecasts. Specifically, EIt [yt+1] = µ̂t. Recall that cashflow growth is forecasted for the next
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period. The conditional expectation EIt [yt+i] for cashflow growth beyond this horizon, i > 1,
is equal to zero, its unconditional mean. This implies
EIt [Nt+i] = E
I
t [Nt + yt+1 + · · ·+ yt+i] = Nt + µ̂t . (11)
The pricing formulation in (11) is similar to Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) with a
critical distinction. Our aggregate cashflow estimate µ̂t results from a combination of cashflow
forecasts rather than a single incorrect forecast.





which implies that the simple return between t and t + 1 equals






The realized return over the (t, t + 1] horizon depends on two elements, the realized forecast
error, yt+1 − µ̂t, and next period’s aggregate cashflow estimate, µ̂t+1.





Thus, the expected return is determined by changes in the aggregate cashflow estimate. With
µ̂t being a weighted average of the individual forecasts, its dynamics depend on changes in
the information weights as well as the dynamics of individual forecasts. For expositional





= µjt . (15)
Intuitively, cashflow growth uncertainty causes the information sources to maintain, on aver-
age, their existing cashflow growth forecasts over short horizons. This is consistent with the
information sources being Bayesians with informative priors regarding the expected cashflow
growth rate. It also parallels Hong, Stein, and Yu (2007)’s assumption that investors maintain
9Appendix B demonstrates that the results in this section are unchanged when this assumption is relaxed
and the individual forecasts are updated according to Bayesian principles.
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their prevailing cashflow forecast procedure until there is convincing evidence of its inferiority
compared to another forecast procedure.
Under the assumption in (15), stock returns follow a random walk when there is only
one information source or the information weights are constant. The information weights are
constant if the relative forecast accuracies of the information sources are known. However,
uncertainty surrounding their forecast accuracy implies that the updating of the information
weights generates return predictability. Interestingly, this predictability is not attributable to
time-varying risk nor behavioral biases.





t+1 − ωjt ) µjt
δ
. (16)
Equation (16) implies that the investor’s expected return is proportional to Cov(∆ω, µ), the
covariance between the cashflow forecasts and changes in their information weights:10
Et[Rt+1] = Cov(∆ω, µ)/δ = σ∆ω σµ ρ∆ω,µ/δ, (17)
where Cov(∆ω, µ) is computed across the J forecasts, σµ denotes the cross-sectional dispersion
of the forecasts, and the σ∆ω component represents the amount of updating in the information
weights due to investor learning. As an application of (17), we demonstrate the presence of
earnings momentum in our model.
Proposition 1. Stock prices drift after earnings announcements in the same direction as
the earnings surprise. Specifically, the expected stock return next period is positive (negative)
conditional on realized earnings growth being above (below) its mean.
Et[Rt+1|yt > ȳ] > 0
Et[Rt+1|yt < ȳ] < 0 .
Proof: For tractability, we consider two independent information sources. An optimistic
information source issues a cashflow growth forecast µOt > ȳ and a pessimistic information
source issues a forecast µPt < ȳ. By symmetry, we prove Proposition 1 for the case of a positive
earning surprise.
10The cross-sectional mean of ∆ω is zero by definition since the information weights sum to one.
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By (16), the expected stock return is
Et[Rt+1] = (ω
O
t+1 − ωOt )(µOt − µPt )/δ .
Thus, to prove Proposition 1, it is sufficient to show that
E[(ωOt+1 − ωOt )|yt > ȳ] > 0 . (18)
The optimal weights in (6), with two information sources, imply that ωOt+1−ωOt is proportional
to σ2P,t+1 σ
2










P,t − ε2P,t−n)/n .
We claim that after a positive earning surprise, the estimated accuracy of the optimistic
information source on average improves relative to the pessimistic information source. Thus,
the information weight for the optimistic information source tends to increase, ωOt+1−ωOt > 0.
This property follows directly from the following inequalities:
E[(ε2O,t − ε2O,t−n)|yt > ȳ] < 0, (19)
E[(ε2P,t − ε2P,t−n)|yt > ȳ] > 0 . (20)
A positive earnings surprise at date t does not provide useful information about the previous
forecast error at t − n. Thus, E[ε2j,t−n|yt > ȳ] is simply the unconditional second moment of
the jth information source’s forecast error, and (19) and (20) are equivalent to
E[ε2O,t|yt > ȳ] < E[ε2O,t|yt < ȳ] , (21)
E[ε2P,t|yt > ȳ] > E[ε2P,t|yt < ȳ] . (22)
To prove (21) and (22), observe that each realization yt > ȳ has a one-to-one correspondence
with a y′t < ȳ having the same probability density. For the optimistic information source, since
ȳ < µOt , the forecast errors εO,t and ε
′
O,t corresponding to yt and y
′
t respectively satisfy |εO,t| <
|ε′O,t|, with (21) following immediately from this property. Conversely, for the pessimistic
information source, since ȳ > µPt , the forecast errors εP,t and ε
′
P,t corresponding to yt and y
′
t
respectively satisfy |εP,t| > |ε′P,t|, with (22) following immediately from this property.¥
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Proposition 1 proves the existence of earnings momentum (or post-earnings announcement
drift) in our model. A related empirical anomaly is price momentum. Chan, Jegadeesh,
and Lakonishok (1996, 1999) as well as Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) report that a large
portion of price momentum occurs around earnings announcements. Campbell and Shiller
(1988) demonstrate that stock returns are either attributable to changes in expected discount
rates or expected cashflows. With a constant discount rate, stocks returns are attributable
to changes in expected cashflow. Thus, price momentum and earnings momentum are closely
related in our model.
Simulations investigate the magnitude of price momentum that can arise from changing
information weights. The simulations have an initial cashflow N0 of 1, zero unconditional
mean cashflow growth (θ̄), and a 3 percent cashflow growth volatility (σy). This σy parameter
is estimated as the standard deviation of the dividend growth rate for S&P 500 companies,
which is historically 3.4 percent per annum. The σθ parameter represents the uncertainty
surrounding expected cashflow growth. This parameter is chosen to be 1 or 2 percent, which
is reasonable in compared to σy. In each simulated economy, there are two cashflow forecasts.
The optimistic forecast for period t + 1’s cashflow is Nt + Disp, while the pessimistic forecast
is Nt − Disp, where Disp measures the dispersion between the two forecasts. Our Disp
parameter implies forecast dispersion is approximately 1.5 percent to 3 percent, which is quite
conservative.
For each set of (σθ, Disp) parameters, we first simulate 2,000 cashflow and price paths
according to (1), (2), (3), and (12). Each simulation path contains 120 monthly time-series
observations. Then, for each time period, we rank the 2,000 simulation paths cross-sectionally
based on stock returns over the last six periods. The top and the bottom deciles form zero-
cost momentum portfolios (winners minus losers). Table 1 reports the average returns of the
momentum portfolios during the formation period, as well as over three subsequent holding
periods.
Table 1 shows that the price momentum strategy is profitable in our model. Under rea-
sonable parameters, it yields significant profits ranging from 0.68% to 0.94% per month. The
magnitude of these profits is consistent with the findings of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993).
The reversal of momentum profits at longer holding periods in Table 1 is also consistent with
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the empirical evidence in Lee and Swaminathan (2000).
The intuition for the momentum results in Table 1 is as follows. In the simulated economy,
cashflow growth is equally likely to be positive or negative, and the information sources have
identical true accuracies. The price momentum sort identifies paths where there is a recent
trend in cashflow growth. For illustration, suppose a sequence of positive cashflow growth
realizations occurs by chance. This sequence enhances the optimistic information source’s
credibility. Therefore, the investor gradually assigns more weight to the optimistic informa-
tion source. This shift in the information weights increases the aggregate cashflow estimate
and leads to a further price increase. Eventually, forecast errors that contradict the earlier
estimated accuracies are realized. The investor then updates the relative accuracy of the in-
formation sources and reduces the weight assigned to the optimistic information source. This
updating causes a decline in the investor’s aggregate cashflow estimate and lowers the stock
price. Thus, trends in realized cashflows that are attributable to chance produce short-term
momentum that reverts over the long-term.
Besides return predictability, fluctuations in the information weights produce additional
return volatility. This feature is consistent with Shiller (1992)’s assertion that stock return
volatility is excessive relative to the volatility of cashflow. However, excess volatility is induced
by learning in our model, not irrationality. Lewellen and Shanken (2002)’s learning model also





σ2y + Vart (µ̂t+1 − µ̂t)
]
. (23)




Consequently, forecast accuracy uncertainty leads to variability in the aggregate cashflow
estimate that increases return volatility.
C. Appearance of Biases
Our framework can explain the appearance of behavioral biases that have previously been
used to generate momentum, although behavioral biases are not assumed to influence investor
expectations.
11Note that Covt(yt+1, µ̂t+1 − µ̂t) = 0 because Et[yt+1] = 0 and (15).
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With two positively correlated information sources, the investor focuses their attention on














The higher the correlation between the two information sources, the higher (lower) the in-
formation weight assigned to the more (less) accurate information source. Therefore, a high
positive covariance between the forecasts can effectively eliminate the less accurate informa-
tion source. This feature leads to the appearance of limited attention, which is invoked by
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) as well as Peng and Xiong (2006).
Conversely, a negatively correlated forecast can receive a larger information weight than its
accuracy alone justifies. When an investor’s private cashflow forecast is negatively correlated
with the consensus forecast of analysts, they can appear overconfident as in Daniel, Hirshleifer,
and Subrahmanyam (1998). The appearance of overconfidence also arises when the estimated
accuracy of the investor’s private cashflow forecast is superior to available public forecasts.
Path-dependence in the estimated forecast accuracies is responsible for the appearance
of representativeness and conservatism. These biases are utilized by Barberis, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1998). With the information weights being path-dependent, trends in realized cash-
flow growth change the estimated relative accuracy of information sources. Thus, the in-
vestor’s aggregate cashflow appears to extrapolate from realized cashflows. Furthermore, the
impact of trends on the information weights persists beyond their termination due to the path-
dependence in (7). This property causes the information weights to exhibit conservatism.
III Empirical Implementation
Our empirical implementation tests our model’s implications regarding stock return pre-
dictability, earnings momentum, and price momentum using data on analysts’ earnings fore-
casts and realized earnings from I/B/E/S. Estimation of the information weights, earnings
surprises, and analyst forecast dispersion requires individual analyst forecasts. These forecasts
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begin in January 1984 of the I/B/E/S Detail file. Thus, our sample period is from January
1984 to December 2004. The sample includes all domestic common stocks listed on the NYSE,
AMEX, and NASDAQ that have at least two analyst forecasts, excluding REITs, ADRs, and
stocks priced below $5. We obtain daily and monthly stock returns as well as market capi-
talization data from CRSP, and book-to-market ratios and the earnings announcement dates
from Compustat.
There is significant multi-collinearity among the analyst forecasts. To circumvent this
problem, we classify individual analysts into two groups: optimistic (those with forecasts
above the median) and pessimistic (those with forecasts below the median). We then com-
pute the average of each subset and refer to these averages as the representative optimistic
analyst and representative pessimistic analyst. The information weights of these representa-
tive analysts are computed using their forecast errors over the past eight quarters (n = 8).
From these weights, we construct a variable denoted dW, measured quarterly for each stock,
which represents changes in the weight of the representative optimistic analyst. A positive dW
implies a shift towards the optimistic forecast, while a negative dW implies the representative
pessimistic analyst has gained more influence on the investor’s cashflow expectation.
A. Testable Hypotheses
We test the following predictions of our model.
Prediction 1. A positive (negative) change in the optimistic analyst’s weight dW is associated
with higher (lower) stock returns next month.
By definition, when the weight assigned to the optimistic analyst increases at the expense
of the pessimistic analyst, the correlation ρ∆ω,µ is positive. Prediction 1 follows immediately
from (17).
Prediction 2. Momentum is stronger for stocks experiencing greater fluctuations in their
information weights.
This prediction follows from (17), which demonstrates that momentum profits increase
with σ∆ω.
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Prediction 3. Momentum is stronger for stocks that have larger forecast dispersions.
This prediction follows from (17), which demonstrates that momentum profits increase
with σµ. Since forecast dispersion measures cashflow uncertainty, our model predicts stronger
momentum for stocks with high cashflow uncertainty.
B. Results
To test Prediction 1, each quarter we sort stocks into five dW quintiles around earnings
announcements. Stocks are held for one month after portfolio formation. For the top dW
decile, where the optimistic analysts are gaining weight, the average stock return is 1.45% per
month over the 1984 to 2004 sample period. In contrast, the average return of the bottom
decile dW portfolio is 0.73% per month.12 The difference is 0.72% with a t-statistic of 3.14.
After adjusting for the Fama-French (1993) three factors and the Pástor-Stambaugh (2003)
liquidity factor, the difference in the average returns of dW5 and dW1 portfolio is even larger
at 0.93%, and statistically significant.
As expected, there is more updating in the information weights after larger earnings sur-
prises. As detailed in the proof of Proposition 1, on average, positive earnings surprises (hence
positive returns) cause relatively optimistic information sources to receive more weight while
negative earnings surprises (hence negative returns) cause relatively pessimistic information
sources to receive more weight. This feature is also supported by the data. For stocks with
positive earnings surprises, 64.24% have a positive dW. Conversely, for stocks with negative
earnings surprises, 71.1% have a negative dW. An earnings surprise is measured as the dif-
ference between a firm’s actual earnings and the prevailing consensus analyst forecast, scaled
by the consensus forecast. To exclude stale information, we include only the latest forecast
issued by each analyst. These forecasts are required to be issued within one-year prior to an
earnings announcement.
Prediction 2 is tested using price momentum and earnings momentum. We implement
a 6-1-1 price momentum strategy. At the end of every month, stocks are assigned to five
12Average return increases monotonically with dW. For example, the average return of the middle decile
dW3 portfolio is 1.16% per month, smaller than that of the dW5 portfolio but larger than dW1.
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quintiles (P1 to P5) in ascending order according to their returns over the prior six months.
After skipping one month, the momentum portfolios are held for an additional month. Price
momentum is computed as the average difference between the holding-period return of the P5
portfolio (past winners) and the P1 portfolio (past losers).
Earnings momentum parallels the price momentum strategy. Instead of sorting stocks
according to their past returns, earnings momentum portfolios (E1 to E5) are formed according
to their most recent earnings surprise. Earnings momentum is the average return difference
between E5 (positive surprises) and E1 (negative surprises) over the monthly holding periods.
To test Prediction 2, we compare the average returns of double-sorted portfolios formed
using past six-month returns or earnings surprises and dW. Over the cross-section of stocks,
dW is positively correlated with formation-period returns and earnings surprises.13 Thus,
we perform conditional double-sorts in both directions. For example, in Panel A of Table 2,
we first sort stocks according to their returns over the prior six months, with a second sort
conditioning on dW. Conversely, in Panel B of Table 2, the sorting order is reversed. The
results for Prediction 2 do not depend on the order of the conditional double-sorts.
The empirical results in Table 2 indicate stronger price momentum in the dW1 portfolio
and dW5 portfolio, relative to the dW3 portfolio. For example, Panel A reports that the price
momentum strategy generates an average monthly return of 0.91% and 1.15% for stocks in the
dW1 and dW5 portfolios respectively, but only 0.18% for the dW3 portfolio. The difference in
price momentum between dW1 and dW3 is 0.72% per month, with a t-statistic of 1.97. The
difference in price momentum between dW1 and dW3 is 0.97% per month, with a t-statistic
of 2.43. Therefore, consistent with Prediction 2, greater updating in the information weights
leads to stronger price momentum. This pattern appears in unadjusted returns as well as
risk-adjusted returns that account for the Fama-French (1993) three factors and the liquidity
factor of Pástor and Stambaugh (2003).
The earnings momentum results in Table 3 exhibit a similar pattern as price momentum.
In comparison to the dW3 portfolio, earnings momentum is stronger in the dW1 portfolio and
the dW5 portfolio. Therefore, consistent with Prediction 2, earnings momentum also depends
13The time-series average of the monthly cross-sectional correlation between dW and earnings surprises is
0.20, while the correlation between dW and formation period returns is 0.13.
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on the amount of updating in the information weights.
For emphasis, our study is limited to firms with at least two analysts. Thus, our sample
is orientated towards more established firms and those with greater analyst coverage. Hong,
Lim, and Stein (2000) document weaker price momentum in larger stocks and stocks with
greater analyst coverage. Our results confirm this finding. However, even for firms with at
least two analysts, our refined price momentum strategy that conditions on fluctuations in the
information weights can produce high profits. The results in Table 2 (Panel A) indicate that
past winners, which experience large increases in the optimistic analyst’s weight, and past
losers, which experience large decreases in the optimistic analyst’s weight, produce an average
monthly return spread of 1.8%. This return spread equals the difference between the average
return of the (P5,dW5) portfolio and the (P1,dW1) portfolio. Consequently, our enhanced
momentum return is larger than the 1% monthly return from the standard momentum strategy
that does not condition on information weight fluctuations.
Finally, we test Prediction 3 by comparing the profitability of price momentum and earn-
ings momentum across analyst forecast dispersion quintiles. At the end of each month, forecast
dispersion is measured as the standard deviation of all forecasts issued during the past year
for earnings in the current fiscal year. This standard deviation is then scaled by the consensus
forecast.14 Stocks are then sorted into quintiles (U1 to U5), with U1 containing stocks with
the lowest forecast dispersion and U5 containing stocks with the largest forecast dispersion.
Table 4 shows that price momentum and earnings momentum both monotonically increase
from the U1 portfolio to the U5 portfolio. Price momentum among stocks with high analyst
forecast dispersion is about 1% higher per month than price momentum among stocks with
low analyst forecast dispersion (U5-U1). Similarly, earnings momentum among stocks with
high analyst forecast dispersion is about 0.5% higher per month than earnings momentum
among stocks with low analyst forecast dispersion. These differences are both statistically
and economically significant. Therefore, the results in Table 4 support Prediction 3 as stocks
with greater analyst forecast dispersion have stronger momentum.
14Similar results are obtained when we scale by the stock price at the end of the prior year.
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C. Other Predictions
Our model also has a number of predictions for price momentum and earnings momentum
that are consistent with previous empirical findings.
Prediction 4. Momentum is stronger for small firms, young firms, and firms whose funda-
mentals are undergoing significant changes.
Young firms (IPOs) and small firms have fewer available forecast errors to estimate the
accuracy of each information source (small n in (7)). Thus, each additional forecast error exerts
a greater impact on the investor’s learning process and induces more dramatic fluctuations in
the information weights (larger σ∆ω). Consistent with this prediction, Jiang, Lee, and Zhang
(2005) and Zhang (2006) report that young firms and small firms exhibit stronger momentum.
More established firms have a larger number of forecast errors available for estimating
each information source’s accuracy. However, when significant firm-specific, industry, and
macroeconomic shocks occur, their cashflow implications may not be immediately understood
and agreed upon by market participants (Brav and Heaton (2002)). Instead, these shocks can
increase forecast accuracy uncertainty. Thus, we predict stronger momentum in stocks whose
fundamentals are undergoing significant changes. Consistent with this prediction, Jackson and
Johnson (2006) document that momentum is concentrated around seasoned equity offerings,
stock re-purchases, equity-financed mergers, and dividend initiations as well as omissions.
Prediction 5. Momentum is stronger for stocks with higher return volatility and for stocks
with higher cashflow volatility.
This prediction follows from the fact that fluctuations in the information weights create
momentum and increase return volatility. Thus, stronger momentum coincides with periods
of higher return volatility. Jiang, Lee, and Zhang (2005) and Zhang (2006) report that stocks
with more volatile returns have stronger momentum. However, they interpret their results as
evidence that behavioral biases influence asset prices while our framework offers an alternative
interpretation.
Greater momentum for stocks with higher cashflow volatility is also predicted, although
momentum profits are not compensation for cashflow risk in our model. As firms with high
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cashflow volatility (large σy) tend to have high forecast dispersion (large σµ), this prediction
is subsumed by Prediction 2 and not tested.
IV Conclusions
We study stock prices in a simple model where the investor optimally combines multiple
cashflow forecasts of unknown accuracy. The weights assigned to these forecasts depend
on the accuracy of their issuer, which the investor estimates from past forecast errors. We
demonstrate that earnings momentum and price momentum arise from these weights being
updated as the investor gradually learns about the relative accuracy of the information sources
issuing forecasts. Return predictability in our model is not caused by time-varying risk or
behavioral biases.
Empirical tests provide strong support for the model since changes in the information
weights predict stock returns and affect the profitability of earnings momentum and price
momentum strategies. Simulation evidence confirms that under reasonable parameter values,
our framework produces momentum whose magnitude is comparable with existing empirical
evidence.
Our framework offers several interesting applications for future research. For example, our
aggregate cashflow estimate may improve upon the consensus earnings forecast (simple aver-
age) used in prior research. Our information weights can also be applied to better understand
investor decisions to switch between investment styles and style momentum.
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A. Regression Interpretation of the Optimal Weights
The linear regression Y = UW + ε minimizes the following sum of squared residuals
(Y −UW )T (Y −UW ) , (25)
by selecting W . This J × 1 matrix of information weights is often denoted β, while U
represents a n × J matrix of cashflow forecasts that is usually denoted X when minimizing
(y −Xβ)T (y −Xβ). In our context, the columns of U are forecasts issued by an information
source during the previous n periods, while the n × 1 vector Y denotes the corresponding
realized cashflows.
Inserting the constraint 1T W = 1 into (25) yields
(
Y1T W −UW)T (Y1T W −UW) = [(Y1T −U) W ]T (Y1T −U) W
= W T
(
Y1T −U)T (Y1T −U) W
= nW T ΘW
since Y1T −U is an n×J matrix of forecast errors and 1
n
(
Y1T −U)T (Y1T −U) equals the
Θ matrix whose elements are estimated using (7) and (8). Therefore, the objective function
in (5) is identical to linear regression with a zero intercept and coefficients that sum to one.
B: Alternative Forecast Dynamics
This appendix relaxes the assumption that the cashflow forecasts are, on average, constant
over short-horizons. Consider three scenarios defined by the realized cashflow yt+1
1. yt+1 > µ
O
t
2. yt+1 < µ
P
t
3. µPt < yt+1 < µ
O
t
where µOt and µ
P
t denote the optimistic and pessimistic cashflow forecast respectively. In the
first scenario, the optimistic and pessimistic information source both increase their cashflow




t . These increases are consistent with
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imply the first scenario generates the µ̂t+1 > µ̂t relationship. Similarly, in the second scenario,
the optimistic and pessimistic information source both decrease their cashflow forecasts since




t . This updating of the individual forecasts yields µ̂t+1 < µ̂t.















where εOt+1 and ε
P








The condition in (26) states that the (absolute) amount by which the optimistic (pessimistic)
information source updates their forecast downwards (upwards) is proportional to their es-
timated accuracy in (7). Therefore, the relatively less accurate information source updates
their cashflow forecast more dramatically in the direction of the realized cashflow, with (26)
being consistent with Bayesian updating.
According to (16), the expected stock return Et[Rt+1] is determined by the expected change











































To demonstrate that momentum occurs in the third scenario, consider two cases. First,
after positive cashflow growth realizations, the optimistic information source becomes more


































> 0 . (28)
The above inequality follows from the optimistic information source being assigned a larger
portfolio weight, ∆ωOt > 0, while the µ
O
t − µPt > 0 and ∆ωOt + ∆ωPt = 0 properties hold by
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t = 0 ,






O,t+1. Thus, Et[µ̂t+1] > µ̂t after positive
cashflow growth.
The second case involves negative cashflow growth realizations, which cause the weight of
the pessimist to increase at the optimist’s expense. In other words, ∆ωPt > 0 and ∆ω
O
t < 0.






t , are negative
when combined, while the remaining terms again sum to zero. Thus, Et[µ̂t+1] < µ̂t after
negative cashflow growth.
To summarize, expected returns are higher (lower) following a series of positive (negative)
cashflow growth realizations when the individual cashflow forecasts are updated according to
Bayesian principles.
Table 1: Simulated Returns from Momentum Strategy
This table presents the average returns of momentum portfolios based on simulations with the following
common inputs: initial cashflow N0 = 1, unconditional cashflow growth θ̄ = 0, and cashflow volatility σy =
0.03. There are two cashflow forecasts. The optimistic forecast for period t + 1’s cashflow is Nt + Disp, while
the pessimistic forecast is Nt − Disp, where Disp measures the dispersion of the two forecasts. Each row
corresponds to a set of simulations using these inputs along with the specified σθ (uncertainty surrounding
expected cashflow growth) and Disp parameters. For each set of parameters, we simulate 2000 cashflows and
prices, with each time-series containing 120 observations. For each observation, the 2000 simulation paths are
ranked cross-sectionally based on their cumulative returns over the last 6 periods. The momentum portfolio is
the top decile minus and the bottom decile. The table reports the time-series average return of the momentum
portfolios during the formation period, as well as over subsequent holding periods ranging from 1 to 6 periods.
The mean returns for each holding period are recorded below with t-statistics in parentheses.
σθ Disp Formation period Holding period returns
return (6 Periods) 1 Period 3 Periods 6 Periods
0.0100 0.0100 0.3200 0.0068 -0.0009 -0.0094
(7.3081) (-0.7042) (-5.7803)
0.0200 0.0100 0.4269 0.0074 -0.0031 -0.0135
(5.9231) (-1.5030) (-5.3187)
0.0100 0.0200 0.3321 0.0091 0.0027 -0.0041
(9.6328) (1.7454) (-1.9609)
0.0200 0.0200 0.3821 0.0094 0.0014 -0.0077
(7.4238) (0.8075) (-3.3060)
Table 2: Price Momentum Conditional on Information Weight Change
This table summarizes price momentum conditional on the amount of updating in the information weights.
This updating is denoted dW and equals the representative optimistic analyst’s weight change from the
previous earnings announcement. At the end of each month from January 1984 to December 2004, stocks
from the intersection of the CRSP and IBES datasets are ranked on their returns over the past six months and
dW. Stocks are then assigned to momentum quintiles (P1 to P5) and dW quintiles (dW1 to dW5) in ascending
order. The dW1 portfolio contains stocks whose weight is shifting from the representative optimistic analyst
towards the representative pessimistic analyst, while the dW5 portfolio contains stocks whose weight is shifting
from the representative pessimistic analyst towards the representative optimistic analyst. Price momentum is
the zero-cost portfolio that buys P5 and sells P1 every month, implemented within each dW portfolio. Panel
A reports price momentum when stocks are first sorted on past returns, then on dW. Panel B reports the
results when the sorting order is reversed. Unadjusted returns and those adjusted by the Fama-French (1993)
three factors and the Pástor-Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor are both provided.
Panel A: sorted on MOM first, then on dW
P5-P1 return spread Holding period returns unadjusted 4-factor adjusted
over past six months P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P5-P1 t-stat P5-P1 t-stat
dW1 91.50 0.33 0.86 0.94 0.72 1.24 0.91 1.60 1.00 1.58
dW2 81.17 0.40 1.15 0.36 0.47 0.90 0.50 0.82 0.45 0.65
dW3 75.12 0.74 0.73 1.31 0.19 0.93 0.18 0.30 -0.02 -0.03
dW4 78.77 1.15 1.33 1.44 1.43 1.66 0.51 0.90 0.42 0.68
dW5 88.46 0.98 1.59 1.28 1.82 2.13 1.15 1.96 1.15 1.72
dW1 - dW3 0.72 1.97 1.02 1.92
dW5 - dW3 0.97 2.43 1.17 2.39
Panel B: sorted on dW first, then on MOM
P5-P1 return spread Holding period returns unadjusted 4-factor adjusted
over past six months P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P5-P1 t-stat P5-P1 t-stat
dW1 87.91 0.62 1.03 0.86 0.71 1.35 0.73 1.49 1.00 1.83
dW2 77.41 0.45 0.57 1.09 0.21 0.91 0.46 0.78 0.18 0.28
dW3 73.61 0.81 0.90 0.65 0.84 0.91 0.10 0.16 0.21 0.30
dW4 73.26 0.97 0.94 1.36 1.42 1.46 0.49 1.04 0.31 0.60
dW5 89.41 0.87 1.68 1.59 1.97 1.95 1.09 1.75 1.15 1.64
dW1 - dW3 0.63 1.80 0.79 1.89
dW5 - dW3 0.98 2.47 0.94 2.45
Table 3: Earnings Momentum Conditional on Information Weight Change
This table summarizes earnings momentum conditional on the amount of updating in the information weights.
This updating is denoted dW and equals the representative optimistic analyst’s weight change from the
previous earnings announcement. At the end of each month from January 1984 to December 2004, stocks from
the intersection of the CRSP and IBES datasets are ranked according to their most recent earnings surprise
and dW. Stocks are then assigned to earnings surprises quintiles (E1 to E5) and dW quintiles (dW1 to dW5) in
ascending order. The dW1 portfolio contains stocks whose weight is shifting from the representative optimistic
analyst towards the representative pessimistic analyst, while the dW5 portfolio contains stocks whose weight
is shifting from the representative pessimistic analyst towards the representative optimistic analyst. Earnings
momentum is the zero-cost portfolio that buys E5 and sells E1 every month, implemented within each dW
portfolio. Panel A reports earnings momentum when the stocks are first sorted on earnings surprises, then on
dW. Panel B reports the results when the sorting order is reversed. Unadjusted returns and those adjusted by
the Fama-French (1993) three factors and the Pástor-Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor are both provided.
Panel A: sorted on MOM first, then on dW
E5-E1 return spread Holding period returns unadjusted 4-factor adjusted
over past six months E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E5-E1 t-stat E5-E1 t-stat
dW1 29.79 0.19 0.44 0.21 0.09 1.44 1.25 2.33 1.43 2.39
dW2 30.19 0.10 0.04 0.19 0.73 0.66 0.57 1.10 0.88 1.62
dW3 25.97 0.55 0.71 0.60 1.20 1.24 0.69 1.46 0.92 1.75
dW4 25.16 0.49 0.26 0.35 1.22 0.95 0.46 1.04 0.59 1.19
dW5 25.41 0.45 0.37 0.57 0.98 1.62 1.17 2.63 1.36 2.68
dW1 - dW3 0.56 1.72 0.51 1.55
dW5 - dW3 0.48 1.60 0.44 1.43
Panel B: sorted on dW first, then on MOM
E5-E1 return spread Holding period returns unadjusted 4-factor adjusted
over past six months E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E5-E1 t-stat E5-E1 t-stat
dW1 29.57 0.27 0.16 0.72 0.91 1.37 1.10 2.89 1.08 2.99
dW2 28.68 0.54 0.12 -0.13 0.67 1.29 0.75 1.31 1.01 1.67
dW3 27.10 0.31 0.12 0.26 0.23 0.89 0.58 1.31 0.72 1.64
dW4 25.52 0.41 0.45 0.01 1.33 1.41 0.99 2.50 0.78 2.56
dW5 28.47 0.63 0.59 0.61 0.57 1.54 0.91 1.74 1.17 1.78
dW1 - dW3 0.52 1.69 0.36 1.53
dW5 - dW3 0.33 1.29 0.45 1.37
Table 4: Price and Earnings Momentum Conditional on Forecast Dispersion
This table describes the profitability of price momentum and earnings momentum conditional on analyst fore-
cast dispersion. At the end of each month from January 1984 to December 2004, stocks from the intersection
of the CRSP and IBES datasets are ranked on either their returns over the past six months or their most
recent earnings surprises, along with their prevailing forecast dispersion. Stocks are then assigned to either
past return quintiles (P1 to P5) or earnings surprise quintiles (E1 to E5) along with uncertainty quintiles
(U1 to U5). Price momentum is the zero-cost portfolio that buys P5 and sells P1 every month. Earnings
momentum replaces the past return quintiles with the most recent earnings surprises (E1 to E5). Panel A
reports price momentum when stocks are first sorted on past returns, then dispersion, while Panel B reverses
the order of the double-sort. Panel C and Panel D record our results for earnings momentum rather than
price momentum. Unadjusted returns and those adjusted by the Fama-French (1993) three factors and the
Pástor-Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor are both provided.
Panel A: price momentum, sorted on MOM first, then on uncertainty
P5-P1 return spread Holding period returns unadjusted 4-factor adjusted
over past six months P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P5-P1 t-stat P5-P1 t-stat
U1 76.26 0.83 1.34 1.38 1.44 1.44 0.61 1.98 0.61 1.71
U2 75.30 0.81 1.27 1.34 1.35 1.62 0.81 2.65 0.77 2.21
U3 76.87 0.74 1.41 1.36 1.26 1.72 0.98 3.25 0.87 2.50
U4 79.25 0.80 1.30 1.38 1.16 1.83 1.03 3.26 0.92 2.53
U5 84.78 0.35 1.06 1.28 1.25 1.98 1.63 4.88 1.41 3.63
U5 - U1 1.02 4.46 0.80 3.19
Panel B: price momentum, sorted on uncertainty first, then on MOM
P5-P1 return spread Holding period returns unadjusted 4-factor adjusted
over past six months P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P5-P1 t-stat P5-P1 t-stat
U1 76.21 1.25 1.31 1.39 1.53 1.90 0.66 2.19 0.67 1.52
U2 70.14 0.84 1.32 1.32 1.25 1.63 0.78 2.67 0.59 1.77
U3 71.82 0.91 1.45 1.37 1.22 1.82 0.91 3.22 0.81 2.52
U4 76.41 0.79 1.19 1.32 1.33 1.70 0.91 3.10 0.65 1.93
U5 84.38 0.23 0.92 1.13 1.26 1.81 1.58 4.57 1.31 3.26
U5 - U1 0.92 4.34 0.64 2.70
Panel C: earnings momentum, sorted on MOM first, then on uncertainty
E5-E1 return spread Holding period returns unadjusted 4-factor adjusted
over past six months E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E5-E1 t-stat E5-E1 t-stat
U1 28.07 0.99 1.10 1.32 1.39 1.65 0.65 2.90 0.78 2.96
U2 25.79 0.96 1.16 1.15 1.34 1.64 0.68 2.84 0.71 2.57
U3 25.31 0.90 1.20 1.21 1.35 1.72 0.82 3.89 0.85 3.54
U4 26.22 0.87 1.08 1.29 1.33 1.73 0.86 3.53 0.84 2.91
U5 25.16 0.50 1.14 1.27 1.42 1.66 1.17 4.51 1.35 4.80
U5 - U1 0.52 3.05 0.57 3.32
Panel D: earnings momentum, sorted on uncertainty first, then on MOM
E5-E1 return spread Holding period returns unadjusted 4-factor adjusted
over past six months E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E5-E1 t-stat E5-E1 t-stat
U1 20.96 1.15 1.20 1.43 1.57 1.73 0.58 3.05 0.66 3.03
U2 20.49 0.99 1.14 1.28 1.36 1.58 0.59 3.11 0.63 2.92
U3 22.21 1.00 1.17 1.27 1.32 1.81 0.82 4.45 0.73 3.22
U4 24.15 0.93 1.20 1.13 1.43 1.77 0.84 4.20 0.88 3.68
U5 27.10 0.62 0.80 1.04 1.23 1.76 1.14 4.43 1.29 4.41
U5 - U1 0.56 3.23 0.63 3.84
